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NONMAJORITY UNIONS, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
PROGRAMS, AND WORKER ORGANIZING:
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
CAROL BROOKE*

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Board's 1992 decision in Electromation, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 1049,1 upheld by the Seventh Circuit
in 1994,2 provoked a political and academic debate about the value of
employer-initiated employee participation programs ("EPPs") and
the effect of these programs on unions and on the rights of employees
to organize. In that case, the Board held that Electromation, a nonunion manufacturing plant, violated section 8(a)(2)1 of the National
Labor Relations Act ("the Act") 4 when it formed employee "action
committees" to consider issues such as absenteeism and attendance
bonuses.5 Section 8(a)(2) of the Act states that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
''
other support to it. 6
The business community reacted swiftly to the decision, calling
for repeal, or at least serious modification, of section 8(a)(2) to allow
for EPPs such as quality circles, quality of work life programs, and
other similar groups.7 Congress weighed in with a bill called the
* Staff attorney with the North Carolina Justice and Community Development Center in
Raleigh, NC. J.D., University of North Carolina, 2000; M.P.H., University of Michigan, 1991;
B.A., Carleton College, 1988. The author wishes to thank the Workers Unity Committee and
Marion Crane for their assistance with this Note.
1. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
2. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
5. See Electromation,309 N.L.R.B. at 997.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
7. See, e.g., Steve Gunderson, Manager's Journal: NLRB Muddied Regulatory Waters,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1993, A10. Rafael Gely outlines the distinctions between the various forms
of employee participation programs in his article, Whose Team Are You On? My Team or My
Team?: The NLRA's Section 8(a)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1997).
Quality circles are small groups of employees, with or without managerial members, who
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Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act ("TEAM Act"), which

sought to rewrite section 8(a)(2) to allow employers to create EPPs in
non-union workplaces as long as the programs represented the
employees to the same extent as management. 8 The argument was
that companies need the improved efficiency and output that results
from employee involvement in order to be competitive in the global
marketplace.9 Many labor advocates responded with dire predictions
of the revival of company unions. They characterized EPPs as sham

organizations,

designed to

indoctrinate

workers

into a pro-

management mentality and to stamp out incipient union organizing. 10
Although President Clinton vetoed the bill on July 30, 1996,11 the
debate continues.
Since Electromation, labor supporters have found themselves
divided. Some assert that the actual effect of Electromation on
employers' ability to establish effective EPPs has been minimal.12
There are writers who find it paternalistic to assume EPPs foster false
consciousness in workers,13 while others sympathize with organized
identify problems and solutions and have responsibilities to the circle that extend beyond the
time of the meeting. Work teams are groups of workers who define a common purpose and set
performance standards for members. Work teams create work structures in which workers' jobs
are interrelated and teams take joint responsibility for decisionmaking. See id. at 335-37.
Charles Heckscher describes quality of worklife ("QWL") programs as employee problemsolving sessions that take place on work time, in which employees identify problems and suggest
solutions. QWLs discuss policy as well as production issues. See CHARLES HECKSCHER, THE
NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 128 (1996).
8. The Teamwork for Employers and Managers Act, S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995)
[hereinafterTEAM Act]. The TEAM Act would have amended § 8(a)(2) to allow an exception
for employers who set up, assist, and/or participate in EPPs "to address matters of mutual
interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety and
health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements
with the employer. Id. § 3.
9. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S7614, at S7615 (daily ed. July 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatfield) ("To be competitive in today's international... market, employees must act in
partnership with management.").
10. See id. at S7617 (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("Management-dominated teams are
antidemocratic mechanisms for companies to fight real worker-selected representative labor
systems. They are anti-union tools.").
11. See Joseph L. Manson et al., The Developing Law of Employee Committees, SD50
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 127, 133 (1999).
12. See, e.g., Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and
ParticipationPrograms in Nonunion Companies?:A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
729 (1999) (showing through interviews with management that Electromation has not caused
many constraints on the ability to establish EPPs); Michael H. LeRoy, "Dealing With"
Employee Involvement in Nonunion Workplaces: Empirical Research Implications for the
TEAM Act and Electromation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31 (1997) (surveying human resource
managers at six Fortune 500 companies and concluding that Electromation did not have a
chilling effect of companies' ability to establish EPPs).
13. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
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labor's stance, 14 and argue for a strict construction of section 8(a)(2).
Finally, some labor advocates focus primarily on other mechanisms

for enhancing employee voice in the workplace, including the elimination of the doctrine of exclusive representation, which requires that
the designated representative be the only representative. This would

also encourage the formation of a relatively new form of employee
organization: identity groups centered on issues of race and/or
gender. 5 A subset of those who promote identity groups also support

the abolition or modification of section 8(a)(2) as another means of
16
promoting employee participation.
The recent attention to identity groups reflects a growing interest

in the topic of nonmajority unions ("NMUs").

An NMU is an

independent organization formed by a group of workers to foster

activism around issues of concern to workers, provide mutual
support, hold job training or other skills-building sessions, or form
coalitions with other labor or community organizations. 17 Some
NMUs closely resemble unions and engage in activities typical to a
union, including assisting members with grievances, educating

workers about their rights, and communicating with management
about health and safety concerns. However, an NMU does not
represent a majority of workers and cannot engage in collective
Prohibition:The Casefor PartialRepeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125,
128 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Robert B. Moberly, Worker ParticipationAfter Electromationand DuPont, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 147, 159 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds.,
1994) (arguing that § 8(a)(2) reforms would hurt organizing and collective bargaining); Rick
Fantasia et al., A Critical View of Worker Participationin American Industry, 15 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 468, 469 (1988) ("Worker participation programs.., are one component of a
larger management offensive to increase capital's power in the workplace and to weaken or
replace an important basis for workers' power, the union.").
15. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Divided Ranks: Privilege and the
United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1616-17 (1999) (arguing that elimination of
majority rule and exclusive representation will allow workers whose interests have not
traditionally been represented by organized labor to gain power in the workplace).
16. See, e.g., Rachel Geman, Safeguarding Employee Rights in a Post-Union World: A New
Conception of Employee Communities, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 369, 388 (proposing the
amendment of section 8(a)(2) to allow employer support for labor organizations "comprised of
members of protected categories (as defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act) and which
exist to protect and serve the needs of members of that protected class.").
17. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions That Represent Less
Than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 637 (1993) [hereinafter Hyde, After Smyrna] (arguing
that union supporters should continue organizing after election loss); Alan Hyde, Employee
Caucuses:A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
149 (1993) [hereinafter Hyde, Employee Caucuses] (arguing that caucuses can be forceful
advocates for workers); Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority: A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.KENT L. REV. 531 (1990) (arguing that nonmajority unions have many opportunities for
activism).
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bargaining, although some have argued persuasively that it should be
18
allowed to do So.

In this Note, I argue that those who support an expanded role
and status for NMUs in the American workplace need to become

active participants in the debate surrounding EPPs. Much of the
analysis and writing in the area of section 8(a)(2) has focused on the
effects of EPPs on existing unions.1 9 In an era in which union power is

steadily declining, 20 workers are showing increased interest in aligning
themselves based on gender, race, or immigrant status, 21 and
employers are touting EPPs.22 It is important to look at the impact
these employer-sponsored programs have on NMUs and the ability of

workers to organize in other nontraditional ways.
This Note analyzes the interactions between EPPs and NMUs,

and the impact of these very different employee organizations on
worker organizing.

In Part I, I describe the work of the Workers

Unity Committee ("the Committee"), an NMU at Consolidated
Diesel Company ("CDC"), a manufacturing plant in Whitakers,
North Carolina, and outline the employer's use of EPPs. Part II
considers the ways in which employer-sponsored EPPs may foster or

hinder worker organization and looks at the current status of section
8(a)(2), under recent decisions of both the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts. I discuss the role, legal standing, and influence
18. See Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority
Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 105 (1993) (arguing that members-only
bargaining may be more responsive to workers' concerns than bargaining via an exclusive
representative).
19. See, e.g., Yonatan Reshef et al., Employee Involvement Programs: Should Unions Get
Involved?, 20 J. LAB. RES. 557 (1999); Rick Fantasia et al., supra note 14, at 468 (analyzing two
case studies of quality of work life programs in union settings); Tove H. Hammer & Robert N.
Stern, A Yo-Yo Model of Cooperation:Union Participationin Management at the Rath Packing
Company, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 337 (1986).
20. See HECKSCHER, supra note 7, at xv ("The futility of organized labor has become even
more apparent as membership has dropped to below 11 percent in the private sector, and has
largely stopped growing even in the public sector.").
21. The growing worker center movement is responding to this trend. See, e.g., Jennifer
Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the
Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995) (describing worker center
whose members are Latin American immigrants working on Long Island); Benjamin Marquez,
Organizing Mexican-American Women in the Garment Industry: La Mujer Obrera, 15 WOMEN
& POL. 65 (1995) (analyzing the experience of a worker center that focuses on the particular
concerns of Mexican American women).
22. Numerous employers spoke in favor of the TEAM Act. See, e.g., Employee
Involvement: Hearings on S. 295 Before the Senate Small Bus. Comm., 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Donna Gooch, Human Resource Director, Sunsoft Corp.) (stating that employee
involvement has helped her company reduce turnover, improve performance, reduce the injury
rate, and motivate employees, and that EPPs are necessary to keep Sunsoft competitive in the
global marketplace).
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on organizing of nonmajority unions in Part III. Finally, in Part IV, I
consider how reform of section 8(a)(2) might impact NMUs and
make recommendations to enhance the viability of these worker-run
organizations. I use the Committee throughout this Note as an
example of an NMU that is currently grappling with the challenge of
organizing workers in a workplace that stresses employee participation. I conclude that worker organization and worker voice are
best served by requiring employers who sponsor EPPs to offer equal
support and assistance to NMUs.
I.

CASE STUDY: CDC WORKERS' UNITY COMMITTEE

A.

Background

Workers at CDC have been building engines for the company, a
joint venture between Cummins Engine Company and J.I. Case
Company, since 1983. 23 There is no union ai CDC; indeed, North
Carolina businesses have one of the lowest unionization rates in the
country. 24 For a number of years, however, a group of CDC
employees have been actively involved in the Committee, an NMU
"committed to building a strong membership organization and
movement for workers [sic] rights and empowerment on the job and
'25
in the community.
The Committee defines its role as follows: "to identify the
pressing issues effecting [sic] CDC workers in the plant and
community; to engage CDC workers in discussions and education
about what needs to be done to improve working conditions; [and] to
involve CDC workers in organized activities that encourage
management to address issues that we face as employees. '26 The
Committee's activism has focused on shopfloor issues such as variable
pay 27 and scheduling, 28 and has extended beyond the plant to include
23. See Kyle Marshall, New Way of Working Slowly Catching On, NEWS & OBSERVER,
Sept. 5, 1993; see also Curtis Sittenfeld, The Factory Powered by People: There's Something
Revolutionary Going on Inside a Facility in North Carolina. By Granting Workers an Extraordinary Level of Responsibility, They Are Achieving ExtraordinaryLevels of Performance,NAT'L
POST, July 10, 1999.
24. See North Carolina Department of Commerce, The Ten Best Reasons for Locating in
North Carolina (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.commerce.cnidr.org:80/commerce/business/
besthtml>.
25. CDC Workers Unity Committee, CDC Workers Unity Committee Purpose and
Program (on file with author).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., CDC Workers Unity Committee ("Committee"), Why an Equal Share, UNITY
NEWS, Aug. 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Committee, Why an Equal Share]; Committee, An Equal
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support for the struggles of workers at other companies 29 and
involvement in local political issues. 30 The Committee's membership

is predominantly African American (CDC's workforce is estimated to
be seventy percent African American), 31and some of its efforts have

32
been directed toward issues of racial discrimination.
The Committee is a good example of what an NMU is able to
accomplish and what its limitations are under the current labor laws.
The Committee's persistence at a company with a strong tradition of
work teams and other types of employee participation is also

illustrative of the ways in which EPPs affect worker organization.
Finally, the example of the Committee is useful because it shows how
labor law reform in the area of EPPs might impact worker-initiated
organizations.
B.

Organizing Techniques and Accomplishments

1. Within the Plant
a)

Wages, Hours, and Conditions of Employment

The Committee has advocated for a number of policy changes at
the plant level. Safety issues have been a focus; for example, after a
worker nearly bled to death on a Sunday at work, the Committee
initiated a campaign to keep the medical department open on the
weekends. 33 The Committee has also been active on a number of
wage issues, pushing management to pay each worker an equal
amount of variable, or bonus, pay,34 and advocating a two dollar an
hour raise for all employees.35 It succeeded in having overtime
Share Is Only Fair,UNITY NEWS, May 1992, at 4.
28. See, e.g., Committee, B-Rodline Workers Return to 8 Hr Day, UNITY NEWS, Jan. 1993,
at 2.
29. See, e.g., Committee, Guatemalan Workers: Morganton, NC, UNITY NEWS, June 1995,
at 4 (discussing poultry workers' fight for union recognition).
30. See, e.g., Committee, Whitakers Voters Elect "Voices for the People," UNITY NEWS,
Dec. 1993, at 2.
31. Telephone Interview with Jim Wrenn, Organizer of the Committee (Aug. 4, 2000).
32. See, e.g., Committee, Discrimination Charges Filed by Manpower Worker, UNITY
NEWS, Dec. 1993, at 1 (supporting a temporary worker who filed racial discrimination charges
after being refused permanent employment).
33. See Committee, Weekend Medical Coverage a Hot Issue; Management Misses the Point,
UNITY NEWS, Dec. 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Committee, Weekend Medical Coverage a Hot Issue];
Committee, Worker Suffers Near Fatal Accident: Workers Call for Weekend Medical Coverage,
UNITY NEWS, Sept. 1993, at 1.
34. See Committee, Why an Equal Share,supra note 27, at 1.
35. See Committee, What CDC Workers Want for Christmas:$2 per Hour Across the Board
Raise, UNITY NEWS, Dec. 1994, at 1.
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included in variable pay calculations,3 6 and has advocated for, and
won, a paid Martin Luther King Day holiday.3 7 The Committee

employs a variety of techniques to organize workers and influence
management, including petitions,38 plant surveys on the Committee's
40
focus issues,39 and meetings with management.

b)

Enforcement of Rights of Individual Workers

The Committee champions the causes of individual workers who
experience unjust treatment on the job.41 The Committee has used its

strong community ties to build community-labor alliances to support
these efforts. For example, after a young couple was fired for leaving

work before their overtime shift had ended in order to pick up their
children during a snowstorm, the Committee organized a letterwriting campaign to the company CEO,42 mobilized community-based

organizations, and appealed to the city council. 43 The Committee won
44
and the couple was reinstated with back pay.

2.

In the Community

The Committee does not simply request support from the local

community; it also is actively involved in promoting activities that
benefit the community. 4 The Committee is highly conscious of the

inter-connectedness of worker and community struggles. It was
instrumental in setting up a Community Empowerment Alliance, a
group designed to work on issues of common concern to the mostly
African American residents of a predominantly unincorporated rural

36. See Committee, 2.5% Raise an Insult After Record Year, UNITY NEWS, Mar. 1995, at 1.
37. See Committee, CDC Workers Celebrate King Day, UNITY NEWS, May 1992, at 2.
38. See Committee, Petition Tradition at CDC, UNITY NEWS, Aug. 1992, at 3.
39. See Committee, Zero in on Safety Shoes, UNITY NEWS, July 1994, at 1; Committee,
VariablePay Movement Picking Up Steam, UNITY NEWS, Jan. 1993, at 1.
40. See Committee, Weekend Medical Coveragea Hot Issue, supra note 33, at 3.
41. See, e.g., Committee, supra note 32, at 1.
42. See Committee, Rehire Cullen and Yolanda Parker,UNITY NEWS, Apr. 1996, at 1.
43. Telephone Interview with Saladin Muhammad, organizer with United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers of America (Nov. 9, 1999).
44. Id.
45. For example, Committee members helped raise funds for a highly successful local,
community-run health clinic in Bloomer Hill. Id. The Committee also sponsors a free biweekly workers' legal clinic at the Workers' Center in nearby Rocky Mount. See, e.g.,
Committee, Workplace and Community Updates, UNITY NEWS, May 1993, at 4.
The
Committee's newsletter, Unity News, includes regular updates of union and NMU organizing
efforts at plants in the nearby area, and encourages CDC workers to support these campaigns.
See, e.g., Committee, Workplace Updates, UNITY NEWS, Aug. 1992, at 4.
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area.4 6 The Alliance's commitment to a community labor agenda has
47
helped prevent retaliatory firings of Committee activists.
The Committee involves itself in local politics, often focusing on
issues of particular importance to African Americans. 48 In Whitakers,
a town in which no African American had served on the city council
in 100 years,49 the Committee became actively involved in the election
campaign of a slate of three African American candidates (including
one CDC employee). 50 Two of the three Committee-endorsed
candidates won. The Committee also supported a boycott of whiteowned businesses in nearby Battleboro during an annexation battle.5
3. Union Campaign
In 1994, the Committee initiated attempts to organize a local
office of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of
America ("UE"). Throughout the years, the Committee has
consistently recognized the limitations of an NMU and lauded the
52
greater achievements possible in an organized environment.
For its part, UE does not use a traditional union-organizing
model in its interactions with CDC workers. Though theoretically
building toward a majority presence in the plant, the main UE
organizer working with the Committee recognizes the inherent value
of NMUs as providing an institutionalized presence of organized
workers within a plant in a region of the country with historically low
rates of organization. His work with the Committee includes
educating workers about the connections between CDC and the
global economy, providing training for shop stewards and other
activists, and maintaining a supportive union presence, so workers
will come to understand the importance of unions and also raise their
expectations about working conditions.5 3 Meanwhile, the Committee/
UE continues as a strong nonmajority presence at CDC.

46. See Telephone Interview with Muhammad, supra note 43.
47. See id.
48. See Committee, supra note 30, at 2.
49. See Telephone Interview with Muhammad, supra note 43.
50. See id.
51. See Committee, Justice for Battleboro, UNrrY NEWS, July 1994, at 2.
52. See, e.g., Committee, All Workers at CDC Deserve King Holiday, UNrrY NEWS, Mar.
1994, at 3 (pointing out that contract workers at CDC do not receive a paid MLK holiday, but
contract workers at a nearby unionized facility do).
53. Telephone Interview with Muhammad, supra note 43.
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C.

Employee ParticipationProgramsat CDC
1.

Teams

CDC is an enthusiastic proponent of the team-based approach.
Teams rotate as a group between a day and night work schedule on a
biweekly basis, and bonuses are awarded to everyone on the team or
to no one on the team.14 CDC emphasizes team responsibility and
team problem solving. The teams address issues such as absenteeism;55 one worker describes calling fellow team members each
morning to wake them up for work. 6 The company's philosophy
towards the teams is expressed during quarterly in-plant meetings
held by the general manager with small groups of employees, in the
company's weekly newsletter, or over the plant's closed circuit
57
television network.
The Committee views the team approach with a cynical eye. In
the Committee's outline of its purpose and policies, it characterizes
the company's team approach as a management tool that does not
allow workers a true voice:
The team concept systems do not give workers real power to
address problems related to production, like speed-ups, forced
over-time, multiple job assignments and health and safety .... The
teams don't provide CDC workers with an independent means of
challenging unfair treatment and discrimination. CDC management defines the guidelines
for the decisions of the teams and can
58
reverse them at will.
2.

Employee Reflective Groups

In addition to the teams, CDC also convenes periodic
"Employee Reflective Groups" to consider specific workplace
policies and to make recommendations. The Reflective Groups have
6
59
dealt with a variety of issues, including wage increases, child care, 0
and health benefits. 61 The Committee is quick to use its newsletter,
Unity News, to point out the problems with management's employee
54. See id.
55. See THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK FOR CONSOLIDATED DIESEL COMPANY 43 (1992)
(on file with author).
56. See Marshall, supra note 23.
57. See Sittenfeld, supra note 23.
58. CDC Workers Unity Committee, supra note 25.
59. See Committee, supra note 35, at 1; Committee, CDC Wages Still Falling Behind,
UNITY NEWS, Mar. 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Committee, CDC Wages].
60. See Committee, CDC Workers Need Day Care, UNITY NEWS, July 1994, at 3.
61. See Committee, New Medical Charge Is a Pay Cut, UNITY NEWS, Jan. 1993, at 3.
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For example, the Health Care Reflective

Group, established by management after worker outcry over
proposed

charges for

health insurance,

recommended

against

charging employees and instead suggested increased company
support for the wellness program and fitness center; however, these

6
ideas were ignored by company officials. 2
The Committee also emphasizes the problem that managementselected representatives compose the reflective groups. 63 The

company's frequent refusal to follow the recommendations of its
committees is also a problem. 64 The committees have no decision6
making power; all suggestions are forwarded to management.

II.

EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS AND WORKER
ORGANIZING

A.

Purposes of Employee ParticipationPlans

1. Employee Performance
EPPs take many different forms, and management asserts a wide

variety of reasons for creating these programs. One rationale is that
EPPs increase productivity and performance by encouraging workers

to make suggestions to improve production. This provides incentives
for workers to perform at a higher level and creates a greater sense of

trust towards management, making the employees more flexible and
responsive. 66 Decreasing employees' resistance to changes in the
workplace and improving morale are often cited as important primary
67
goals of EPPs.

At CDC, credit is given to the team system for the company's
low turnover and injury rates, as well as for enhancing "morale,

62. See id.
63. See Committee, CDC Wages, supra note 59, at 1 (stating that decisions of the reflective
group are not representative of the workers' desires because reflective group members are
chosen by management).
64. See Committee, supra note 60, at 3 (discussing problem that a CDC task force
appointed to look into child care issues was disbanded because management did not want to
fund the projects it proposed).
65. See Committee, Equal Share Update, UNYr NEWS, Feb. 1993, at 1 (noting that the
Payscale Reflective Group can only make recommendations to management).
66. See William N. Cooke, Employee ParticipationPrograms, Group-Based Incentives, and
Company Performance:A Union-Nonunion Comparison,47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 594, 595
(1994).
67. See Susan Schwochau et al., Employee Participation and Assessments of Support for
OrganizationalPolicy Changes, 18 J. LAB. RES. 379, 380, 382 (1997).
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learning, trust, and personal growth. ' 68 CDC has only one supervisor
for every 100 employees; most plants have a ratio of one to twentyfive.

69

2.

Deterrence of Worker Organizing

Some assert a more insidious antiworker, antiunion purpose to
EPPs. Guillermo Grenier conducted a seven-month long study of
quality circles and their impact on workers at Ethicon-Albuquerque
in the early 1980s.70 He concluded that the underlying goal of the
worksite innovations instituted at the plant was to control workers:
"This control is exerted not only over their behavior while on the job
but also when the design works well, over their attitudes about their
work and how they feel all day and their inability to change it."'"
Grenier identifies a number of quality circle characteristics that
enhance management control over workers. These include peer
pressure, sometimes through confrontation, to encourage or discourage particular behaviors, screening of new hires to assess their
union sentiments, division of the workforce into fragmented work
teams, creation of a humanized face for management power, and the
use of managerial language. 72 Thus, workers are manipulated by the
creation of a sense of control coupled with a decrease in actual
control. The divisive effect of EPPs on worker unity and cohesion
may become more pronounced when some workers assume positions
of responsibility with the program.7 3
Suggesting that the benefits workers perceive from EPPs are
illusory, other analysts agree with Grenier's conclusion that EPPs
promote the development of a false sense of worker control over the
workplace. These analysts point out that companies with strong
commitments to EPPs are often antiunion, one stated that "[t]here is
strong evidence that participation programs are carefully controlled
by management precisely to prevent workers from expanding the
scope of their participation, and thus the promise of power is likely to
be an empty one. 7 4 GMC's quality of worklife literature states
68. See Sittenfeld, supra note 23.
69. See id.
70. See GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALITY CIRCLES AND ANTIUNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, at xvi (1988).

71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at xvii-xviii.
See id. at 17.
See Fantasia et a!., supra note 14, at 476-77.
Id. at 471-72.
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outright that the program is not intended to foster workplace
75
democracy.
In some cases, companies promote EPPs as an integral part of an
antiunion strategy. Ethicon-Albuquerque management was able to
use its quality circle structure very effectively to counter an emerging
union campaign. They accomplished this by encouraging discussions
about the union during team meetings, 76 identifying union supporters
as antiteam77 and punishing them for poor attitudes, 78 keeping
prounion workers separated from others through the team system,7 9
and using team meetings as a means for management to inform
workers about its anti-union philosophy. s0 Another researcher has
found a correlation between a corporate anti-union philosophy and
the presence of EPPs, a grievance system, teams, and other
innovations. 81
Even in workplaces where management institutes EPPs at some
point considerably after the plant has become unionized, the two do
not always coexist comfortably. Rick Fantasia points out that a
grievance procedure arrived at through collective bargaining may be
undermined by a quality of worklife program in which management
responds more favorably to grievances raised through the quality of
worklife procedure.8 2 A study of telephone company employees
found that workers who felt positive about employee involvement
were more likely to want their unions to be more involved in the
program.83 This could suggest either genuine enthusiasm for an
empowering EPP, or the sentiments of coopted union members taken
in by management rhetoric.
At CDC, management has made many attempts to deter the
Committee in its organizing efforts. The company has resisted the
Committee's attempts to exercise its members' right to engage in
concerted activity. In August of 1994, the Committee filed an unfair
75. See id. at 474.
76. See Louise Lamphere & Guillermo J. Grenier, Women, Unions, and "Participative
Management": Organizing in the Sunbelt, in WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT
227, 241 (Ann Bookman & Sandra Morgen eds., 1988).
77. See id. at 243-44.
78. See GRENIER, supranote 70, at 83.
79. See Lamphere & Grenier, supra note 76, at 254.
80. See GRENIER, supra note 70, at 60.
81. See Thomas A. Kochan et al., The Effects of Corporate Strategy and Workplace
Innovations on Union Representation, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 487, 494 (1986).
82. See Fantasia et al., supra note 14, at 478.
83. See Yonaton Reshef et al., supra note 19, at 566.
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labor practices ("ULP") charge 84 based on CDC's policy prohibiting
solicitation or distribution of literature by employees during

nonworking time. 85 The Board ruled in the workers' favor, leading to
86
a settlement agreement with CDC.
After the Committee affiliated with UE, the company renewed

its efforts to restrict worker organizing. Committee members who
were also union supporters were charged with harassment under the
company's antiharassment policy for distributing literature.8

Again,

the Committee and UE filed a ULP charge. Because the new charge
was evidence that the company was not following the settlement
agreement reached earlier, the Board revoked the agreement 8 and
combined the old charges with new ones brought by the Committee. 89

The Committee eventually prevailed on both charges.
CDC has been able to use its EPPs to undermine

the

Committee's organization efforts. A team manager prohibited
workers who attempted to sign a Committee petition during a team
meeting from doing so. 90 CDC stepped up its employee participation
activities after the Committee affiliated with UE. The company paid
consultants to survey employees about pay scales and variable pay, 91
issues the Committee had already attempted to address with

management on numerous occasions.

The consultants' work,

however, resulted in a record variable pay bonus for workers. 92

Apart
organizing,
work. In
supported

from the company's efforts to crack down on union
CDC's team structure has hampered the Committee's
response to a Committee survey showing that workers
changes to the variable pay policy,93 management

84. See Committee, Labor Board Victory For UC/UE, UNITY NEWS, Dec. 1994, at 2.
85. See THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK FOR CONSOLIDATED DIESEL COMPANY, supra note
55.
86. See Notice from Director of Human Resources at CDC to the Employees of CDC (Oct.
31, 1994) (on file with author); Committee, supra note 84, at 2.
87. See THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK FOR CONSOLIDATED DIESEL COMPANY, supra note
55, at 43; Committee, HR Must Stop False HarassmentCharges, UNITY NEWS, Dec. 1994, at 2.
88. See Letter from Curtis A. Wells, Acting Regional Director, National Labor Relations
Board, to Bruce Petesch, Esquire, Haynesworth, Baldwin, Johnson and Greaves, and Phil
White, Field Organizer, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (Feb. 10,
1995) (on file with author).
89. See Committee, Labor Board Issues Complaint Against CDC, UNITY NEWS, Mar. 1995,
at 3.
90. See Committee, No Empowerment Here, UNITY NEWS, Oct. 1994, at 4.
91. See Committee, CDC Hires Outsiders to Bust Union, UNITY NEWS, Mar. 1995, at 3.
92. See Committee, First Qtr Variable Pay: It's About Time!, UNITY NEWS, June 1995, at 3.
93. See Committee, supra note 65, at 1.
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established a Payscale Reflective Group, 94 thereby deflecting the
Committee's efforts on this issue. By developing the concept of the
"team player" to describe workers who do not cause trouble, do not
become injured on the job, and are not absent from work, the
company succeeds in creating an atmosphere of peer pressure and in
fracturing worker unity.95
B.

Do Employee ParticipationProgramsLead to Worker
Organizing?

In light of the fact that many companies with overt or disguised
anti-union philosophies also institute EPPs, it would be reasonable to
assume that EPPs only suppress, rather than encourage, worker
organizing. There are indications, however, that the institutional
structures established by EPPs may at times positively affect
organizing efforts. At Ethicon, for example, the initial organizing
committee for the union campaign was comprised of six people from
a single work team.96 Some teams stood their ground successfully
when management began to fight the union, 97 but it was difficult to
spread pro-union resistance to other teams because of the isolation
imposed by the team system. Ultimately, management showed its
hand by disestablishing one of the pro-union teams 98 and setting up a
pro-company committee. 99 Nevertheless, election results indicated
that the teams may have facilitated pockets of union support-the
union won majority support in those quality circles where at least two
members openly supported the campaign. 10 0
A study of EPPs at large U.S. corporations shows that EPPs do
not promote company objectives if they are truly empowering.
Schwochau and others'0 1 found that an important goal for employers
instituting EPPs was to decrease employee resistance to change. The
theory is that "if employees perceive that they are involved in
decisions, this may be sufficient to enhance morale and satisfaction

94. See id.
95. An example is that of a pregnant worker who missed work due to back problems. She
was pressured to return to work by her team members, who did not want to forego the team
bonus. See Telephone Interview with Muhammad, supra note 43.
96. See GRENIER, supra note 70, at 62.
97. See id. at 142-43.
98. See id. at 86-87.
99. See id. at 88-89.
100. See id. at 195.
101. See Schwochau et al., supra note 67, at 380.
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and reduce resistance to change."'' 0 2 The study's results suggest that
employees are not so easily deceived. The employer's desired
outcome was more likely to occur when employees had input on a
wide range of issues, not simply performance and quality, and when
the employees themselves were given the authority to implement
recommended changes. 10 3 Less research has addressed the question
of whether the less empowering forms of EPPs can lead to formation
of a union. Still, Grenier's work suggests that ultimately the
company's ability to manipulate the EPPs to its own advantage will
probably tilt the balance in management's favor in an organizing
campaign.
Committee members have attempted to make use of CDC's team
structure and professed commitment to employee participation, by
encouraging members to run for elected team positions and pushing
teams to discuss issues of concern with the Committee. 0 4 The
Committee's attorney credits the CDC's responsiveness to some of
the Committee's concerns to the company's need to act consistently
with its participatory philosophy. 105 Overall, however, organizers
perceive the teams as a greater hindrance than a help to their
organizing efforts. 1°6
C.

CurrentState of Section 8(a)(2)
1.

Labor Organization

Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prohibits employer domination or
support of a labor organization. 17 The NLRB and the courts have
wrestled with the interpretation of a labor organization under section
8(a)(2), and what actions by the employer establish domination. The
Act defines a labor organization as "any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."" °8
102. Id. at 382.
103. See id. at 397.
104. See Telephone Interview with Muhammad, supra note 43.
105. See Telephone Interview with Travis Payne, attorney for the Committee (Dec. 9, 1999).
The company responded favorably to Committee's demand for a raise when the Committee
compared CDC worker salaries to those at the company's unionized facilities.
106. Id.
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1998).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1998).
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"Dealingwith" the Employer

The "deal with" prong of the definition of a labor organization
has been the subject of considerable litigation. In the only Supreme
Court decision to squarely address section 8(a)(2), 109 the Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit court's opinion that an organization did not
"deal with" the employer when it did not engage in collective
bargaining. The Court defined the "deal with" requirement broadly:
an organization that concerned itself with grievance resolution or
working conditions and which made proposals or attempted to reach
solutions was considered to deal with the employer. 110 The Third
Circuit expanded upon this distinction between collective bargaining
and employer/employee dealings in Slaughter v. NLRB. 1 In that
case, the Board held that forcing an employer to deal with a coworker
(nonunion) representative violated the principle of exclusive
representation because the coworker in effect functioned as a labor
organization. 12 The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that
only the existence of a collective bargaining relationship implicates
exclusivity, and held that collective bargaining is distinct from a labor
13
organization's dealings with an employer.
Having established that "dealing with" and collective bargaining
are two separate things, the courts began to define the types of
activities that constitute a "dealing with" relationship between
employer and organization. Two recent cases present the Board's
current thinking on this issue. In E.L duPont de Nemours, 114 the
Board considered unfair labor practice ("ULP") charges against a
company that set up six safety committees and a fitness committee.
The Board again endeavored to distinguish between bargaining and
"dealing with," characterizing bargaining as a process typically
requiring compromise," 5 whereas "dealing with" is a "bilateral
mechanism" in which employers regularly make proposals to
management which are either accepted or rejected.1 6 The Board
emphasized the give and take nature of dealing, distinguishing

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
Seeid. at 213.
794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
See id. at 127-28.
See id.
311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
See id. at 894.
Id.
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activities such as employee suggestion boxes or brainstorming
117
sessions, which do not involve feedback from management.
The safety and fitness committees established by DuPont dealt
with management in one of two ways: management either considered
and passed judgment on proposals developed by the committee, or
management members of the committee had the power to determine
the fate of such proposals via consensus decisionmaking.18 The
Board emphasized that participation, including voting, by management in the proposal decisions did not create a "dealing with"
relationship. Rather, management's ultimate ability to determine the
outcome was the essential consideration.19
In Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, the Seventh Circuit emphasized
that the literal language of section 2(5)120 defines "labor organization"
very broadly and stated that a broad construction should also be
applied to the requirement of "dealing with.' '121 After workers
approached management to express dissatisfaction with new
employee attendance and bonus policies,122 Electromation established
five action committees on different topics. 1 23 At least one committee
developed a policy proposal that management rejected.12 4
Management, at all times, retained the right to veto any such proposal
developed by one of the committees. 125 On these facts, the Court
upheld the Board's finding that the committees dealt with the
company.
In Vons Grocery Co., the Board applied a narrowing construction to the definition of "deal with. 126 There, the Board held
that a quality circle that made proposals to management regarding
statutory subjects, on just two occasions over a three year period, was
not a labor organization because the group did not regularly make
proposals for management's adoption or rejection.12 7 This interpretation of "dealing with" was consistent with the Board's holding in
117. See id.
118. See id. at 895.
119. See id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
121. 35 F.3d 1148, 1161 (1994).
122. See id. at 1151.
123. See id. at 1152.
124. See id. at 1153.
125. See id. at 1152 (The company president said an action committee's proposal would be
implemented "if they came up with solutions that.., we believed were within budget concerns
and they generally felt would be acceptable to the employees.").
126. 320 N.L.R.B. 53, 54 (1995).
127. See id.
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DuPont, in which the Board required a "pattern or practice" of
submitting proposals to management for approval or rejection.' 2 The
Seventh Circuit in Electromation, however, did not distinguish
between a regular practice of presenting proposals and an ad hoc
130
occurrence, 1 9 nor did the Board.
b) Statutory Subjects
The second, relatively straightforward, requirement for a group
to be considered a labor organization is that it deals with the
employer on the "statutory subjects" outlined in section 2(5):
"grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work." '' The Electromation Court found that the
work of the action committees related to conditions of employment,
including absenteeism and bonuses. 32 Safety and employee benefits
133
also fell under the category of statutory subjects in DuPont.
In Electromation, the Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's
finding that five action committees established by the company to
consider policy issues constituted labor organizations because they
were representative bodies set up to use "a bilateral mechanism
involving proposals from the employee organization concerning the
subjects listed in section 2(5), coupled with real or apparent
' 34
consideration of those proposals by management.'
2.

Employer Domination or Support

The second, highly fact-driven, determination under section
8(a)(2) is whether the employer dominates or supports the labor
organization. The Court cited the following facts to support its
finding of employer domination in Electromation: the committees
were created by management in the face of employee opposition;
several of the committees disintegrated when management ceased to
participate; management established the makeup, purpose, and
procedure of the committees; the committees did not address an area
of identified employee concern; and management ultimately

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
35 F.3d at 1160.
309 N.L.R.B. 990, 997 (1992).
29 U.S.C. § 152(a)(5) (2000).
35 F.3d at 1161.
311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
35 F.3d at 1161.

2000]

IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?

controlled the membership of the committees. 35 The Court held that
employer support for the committees in the form of paid time to do
committee work, meeting space, and supplies did not alone violate

section 8(a)(2) but violated it under the conditions of employer
domination described above. 36
Similar facts were cited to support a finding of employer

domination in DuPont: management's ability to veto committee
proposals via the requirement of consensus, to control membership,
procedure, and the agenda of meetings, and to unilaterally change or
dissolve the committees.137
The Court in Electromation rejected the employer's contention
that a purely subjective test of employee satisfaction is appropriate to
determine whether employer domination has occurred, stating, "It is

entirely possible that an extremely well-constructed

employer-

dominated labor organization could be so 'camouflaged' as to
persuade employees that it represented their best interests and
preserved their free choice when in fact it did not."'13 8 Electromation
strongly suggests a willingness to allow some level of employer

support for employee committees, even bilateral plans, when the
committee has some recognized degree of independence from
management.'3 9 Post-Electromation cases, however, have not raised
this precise issue. In these later cases, the employee committees in
question were established either in opposition to employees' wishes

or in the context of an antiunion campaign by the employer.' 4° The

135. See id. at 1169-70.
136. See id. at 1170.
137. 311 N.L.R.B. at 896.
138. 35 F.3d at 1168.
139. 35 F.3d at 1168. The Court distinguished Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221
F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955), in which the Board's finding of employer domination was denied
enforcement on the basis of several factors: (1) the employees in that case initiated talks with
the employer that led to the creation of an employee association; (2) management did not
participate in the meetings of the association; and (3) management did not control the
membership, agenda, or proposals developed by the committee. See Electromation, 35 F.3d at
1165. Finally, the Court recognized that a finding of employer cooperation, rather than support,
was justified in the latter case because "the labor organization involved has some 'reasonable
claim to being an independent entity composed of employees and distinct from management."'
See id. at 1168 (quoting NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1971)).
140. See NLRB v. Webcor Packaging, Inc., 118 F.3d 1115, 1117-18 (1997), cert. denied,
Webcor Packaging, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S.Ct. 1035 (1998) (employer established Plant Council at
the same time union organizing campaign was taking place); V&S ProGALV, Inc. v. NLRB, 168
F.3d 270, 274 (1999) (committee was established as an in-house union); NLRB v. Autodie
Intern., Inc., 169 F.3d 378, 383 (1999) (employer's recognition of in-house committee as
collective bargaining representative violated section 8(a)(2) when that committee did not have
majority support; later recognition of what was essentially the same committee also violated
section 8(a)(2) despite its apparent majority support from employees).
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court in NLRB v. Webcor Packaging,Inc. enforced the Board's order

to disestablish the committee,1 41 holding that "[i]f the company itself
creates the labor organization ... a showing of actual control is
142
unnecessary" to demonstrate employer domination.
The Board is clearly following a broad construction of sections
8(a)(2) and 2(5). DuPont and Electromation stand for the principle

that a prohibited employer/employee relationship exists if management responds to proposals of the committee on statutory subjects
and retains the ultimate authority to adopt or veto them. Subsequent
Board decisions have upheld this general rule, 143 adding the narrower
interpretation of "dealing with" expressed only in Vons Grocery
Co.144

The Board's

current approach

to the issue of employer

domination and support, however, could leave an opening for
employers to provide some assistance to or recognition of NMUs
without violating section 8(a)(2). The courts, at least in the Sixth
Circuit, are holding firm on rejecting employer-created committees
that can demonstrate a measure of employee support. However, the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Electromation suggests it will be much
less concerned with the false consciousness aspect of employee
committees when the committees are shown to be independent of the

145
employer in creation, membership, and activities.
The CDC teams probably do not violate section 8(a)(2), as they

are organized around production areas."46 In addition, the team's
work is mainly to discuss issues of production and quality, 147 subjects
the court in Electromation found acceptable. 148 They are involved

with the hiring of new team members and with employee discipline at
some level, and management retains final decision-making authority
141. 118 F.3d at 1118.
142. Id. at 1124.
143. See Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1999) (finding that an employee committee
dealt with the employer when management polled committee members and responded later
with its decision); Efco Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1998) (holding that committees presenting
proposals to management for approval or rejection were labor organizations under section
8(a)(2), but a committee which merely screened employee suggestions and forwarded them to
management was not).
144. 320 N.L.R.B. at 54.
145. Electromation, 35 F.3d at 1168.
146. See Payne, supra note 31.
147. See id.
148. 35 F.3d at 1157 (stating that this decision does not rule out other types of EPPs,
"especially those which are independent, which do not function in a representational capacity,
and which focus solely on increasing company productivity, efficiency, and quality control, in
appropriate settings.").
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on these issues. 4 9 Employee grievances are statutory subjects, 50 and
the hiring of new employees may be considered part of working
conditions. To the extent that these activities are a regular part of the
teams' work, the activities may violate section 8(a)(2) because they
represent dealing with the employer on statutory subjects. In
addition, management dominates the teams by setting up criteria for
making recommendations, establishing the goals of the teams, and
facilitating meetings. The everyday work of assessing production and
quality issues without making proposals to management, however,
should not violate section 8(a)(2).
The Employee Reflective Groups, on the other hand, almost
certainly violate section 8(a)(2). They deal with the employer by
making proposals on workplace policy which management either
adopts or vetoes.
Furthermore, the issues considered by the
Employee Reflective Groups clearly fall into the category of statutory
subjects. Finally, the employer dominates the Reflective Groups.
The company creates the committees, controls the membership,
determines the topics for discussion, and at all times controls their
continued existence.
III. NONMAJORITY UNIONS AND WORKER ORGANIZING
A.

Role of Nonmajority Unions

As the percentage of American workers who are union members
declines, there has been increasing attention to the issue of NMUs.
These independent, worker-run organizations can play a number of
different roles in the lives of workers.
Clyde Summers argues that section 9(a)'s exclusive representation doctrine should not detract from the section 7 rights of an
NMU where there is no majority union acting as an exclusive
53
representative. 15 1 Distributing literature, 152 soliciting members,
5
4
striking, and picketing are all protected activities by which an NMU
may engage. Summers suggests that NMUs may assume many of the
traditional roles of a union by establishing an in-plant committee,

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Payne, supra note 105.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
See Summers, supra note 17, at 531-32.
See id. at 534.
See id.
See id. at 535.
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electing shop stewards, 55 and engaging in collective activity that
forces employer action.1 56 Summers also contends that NMUs are
protected in their attempts to bargain with the employer on behalf of
their members. However, given the "relatively weak economic and
legal position" of the NMU that seeks to act under the aegis of
protected concerted activity, 57 Summers advocates for greater
attention to worker education and enforcement of individual rights
instead, 58 including health and safety, benefits, and implied contracts.
Alan Hyde also encourages unions that lose an election to demand
immediate recognition from the employer as the representative of
employees who have signed cards.'5 9 The NMU will then be well
placed to assert its right to whatever benefits the employer grants to
any EPP teams or groups. 60
B.

Legal Status of Nonmajority Unions

The rights which Summers, Hyde, and others argue apply to
NMUs are often contested. The activities which have led to Board
action most frequently in recent years are assertions of the right to
have a co-worker present during an investigatory interview
(commonly referred to as Weingarten rights), issues of what
constitutes protected concerted activity, the ability to bargain and act
as a representative of its members, and the status of NMUs when
EPPs are also present.
1.

Weingarten Rights

The 1975 Supreme Court decision that established Weingarten
rights, NLRB v. Weingarten,161 involved a unionized worksite. The
Court upheld the Board's interpretation that a worker's request that a
union representative be present during an investigatory interview
implicates the employee's section 7162 right to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection 163 where the employee has a
155. See id. at 541.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 542.
158. See id. at 542-43.
159. See Hyde, After Smyrna, supra note 17, at 648.
160. See id. at 659. Hyde discusses using Black Grievance Workers v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 1072,
1073 (3d Cir. 1984) to enforce this right (see text accompanying note 234).
161. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
163. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256.
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reasonable belief that discipline will follow. 64 The Court reasoned
that "[t]he union representative whose participation [the employee]
seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the participating employee's
interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by
exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer does not
165
initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly."
The few cases that have considered the issue of whether
Weingarten rights apply in nonunion workplaces have focused on the
fact that the Court rooted the right in section 7. Johnson v. Express
One International,Inc.,'16 6 a case arising under the Railway Labor Act
("RLA"), 167 considered whether a pilot had a right to have a member
of his pilot's committee, an elected body that was not recognized as a
representative for collective bargaining purposes, present during an
investigatory meeting with management. In denying the pilot's
petition, the Fifth Circuit considered it significant that the RLA's
equivalent to section 7 does not explicitly protect activities conducted
for mutual aid or protection.' 68 The Court held that the rights to
organize and to collectively bargain in and of themselves did not
encompass Weingarten rights,'169 suggesting that it might be receptive
to a case filed under the NLRA on similar facts.
The Third Circuit, in an NLRA case, held that the Act did not
compel a finding that unorganized workers cannot assert Weingarten
rights. 170 The Board's contrary holding had been based upon the
171
finding that Weingarten rights stemmed from the section 8(a)(5)
7
right to bargain collectively.
The Third Circuit reasoned that an
investigatory interview only has the potential to implicate terms and
conditions of employment; therefore, the collective bargaining right is
not involved. 173 Furthermore, the Court held, the section 9(a) right to
17 4
exclusive representation is only operative in a union setting.
In a recent decision, the Board agreed with the Third Circuit's
logic. Reasoning that Weingarten rights are grounded in section 7 and
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 257.
See id. at 260-61.
944 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1991).
See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1994).
See Express One, 944 F.2d. at 251.
See id. at 252.
See Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1986).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994).
See Slaughter,794 F.2d at 126.
See id. at 126.
See id. at 127.
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that section 7 rights are afforded to nonunion employees to the same
extent as union employees, the Board held that nonunion employees
75
may exercise Weingarten rights.1
The Weingarten cases are significant for NMUs for two reasons.
First, the Board's decision in Epilepsy Foundation allows employees
to enforce their right to have a fellow member of an NMU present
during an investigative interview. This provides NMUs an important
role in resolving the problems of their members and increasing their
power in the workplace. Second, the Epilepsy Foundation and
Slaughter holdings that section 9(a)'s influence on section 7 rights is
only implicated when a collective bargaining relationship is
established 176 supports Summers' contention that NMUs (at least in
worksites where no majority union is present) can exercise the full
1 77
range of section 7 rights.
2.

Concerted Activity

Section 7 of the Act guarantees an employee's right to "selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted acts for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.' 178 The latter provision has given
rise to significant litigation over the years. The courts have struggled
to define what employee actions constitute concerted activity in
nonunion workplaces.
The principal case dealing with concerted activity in a union
environment raises important questions of the protections afforded
unorganized workers. In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., the
Supreme Court considered the rights of a truck driver working under
a collective bargaining agreement that prohibited the employer from
requiring employees to drive unsafe vehicles.1 79 The Supreme Court
upheld the Board's ruling that section 7 protection applies to an
individual worker's assertion of a right found in a collective
180
bargaining agreement.
In a case with remarkably similar facts to City Disposal,but with
the critical difference that the employee in question was not a union
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See Epilepsy Found. of N.E. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 92 (2000).
Id.; Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 127.
See Summers, supra note 17, at 534.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (emphasis added).
465 U.S. 822, 824-25 (1984).
See id. at 829.
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member, the Board strictly construed the definition of concerted
activities as it applies to unorganized employees. 181 In Meyers
Industries, the Board held that the Act mandated that a lone
employee from an unorganized workplace could only engage in
concerted activity if he or she acted on the authority of other
employees and if the employer was aware that the employee's actions
were concerted.182 The DC Circuit overruled the Board's finding that
the Act required this narrow construction of section 7.183
Since its decision in Meyers Industries, the Board has shown a
greater willingness to find the link between an individual employee's
actions and those of other unrepresented employees, which is
necessary for activity to be concerted. 184 In McEver Engineering,Inc.,
the Board held that a quick strike by employees protesting dangerous
working conditions was a protected concerted activity despite the
workers' failure to specifically demand relief from the employer.18 5
The Board similarly gave a broad reading to concerted activity in
Compuware Corp., holding that an employee who discussed concerns
with other workers and told them he would represent them in a
meeting with management engaged in protected concerted activity
despite the fact that the other employees did not authorize him to
186
speak on their behalf.
It is hard to identify a trend from such a limited number of cases,
but after Prill, the Board seems to be taking a more expansive
approach toward the rights of unorganized employees acting in
concert for mutual aid and protection. The circuit courts have upheld
findings of concerted activity, even where the connection between the
acts of individual employees and their coworkers is not immediately
obvious.
3.

Employer Recognition and Bargaining

NMUs enjoy far greater rights in the workplace when there is no
union present. Section 9(a) states that a collective bargaining
representative selected by a majority of the employees in a bargaining
unit has the exclusive right to represent that unit in bargaining over
181. See Meyers Indus. Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1985).
182. See id.
183. See Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
184. See City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 831.
185. 275 N.L.R.B. 921, 925 (1985), affd, 784 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1986).
186. 320 N.L.R.B. 101 (1995), affd, 134 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118
S.Ct. 1805 (1998).
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statutory subjects. 87 The Supreme Court strictly construed this
section in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Committee
Organization, holding that a picket and other actions held by a small
group of unionized employees to protest allegedly racediscriminatory practices constituted an attempt to collectively bargain
in violation of the principle of exclusive representation. 188 In an
earlier case in which the company granted recognition to an NMU in
189
the mistaken belief that it represented a majority of the employees,
the majority found a violation of both sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2).
The court held that recognizing an NMU as the exclusive
representative is a form of employer support to a labor organization
prohibited under section 8(a)(2), and it interferes with employees'
section 7 rights to choose their own representatives. 90
Matthew Finkin has made a strong argument that members-only
bargaining should be available to nonmajority unions. 91 At this
point, however, there is no mechanism to force employers to bargain
with groups that do not represent a majority of workers. The
Supreme Court has held that federal courts have jurisdiction to
enforce agreements between employers and nonmajority unions
under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, but
the Court issued a caveat, stating that its opinion did not cover the
issue of "whether minority unions may demand that employers enter
into particular kinds of contracts."' 92 The Court later upheld a Board
decision asserting that an NMU did not have the right to picket in an
attempt to force the employer to bargain. 193 There is, however, no
prohibition on employer bargaining with NMUs in the absence of a
94
majority union.
In addition to petitioning for employer recognition and
bargaining, an NMU may be able to assert a right to equal treatment
when the employer is affording favorable treatment to another group.
In Black Grievance Committee v. NLRB, the court reversed the
Board's dismissal of a section 8(a)(1) complaint filed by the Black
Grievance Committee. 95
The Committee was an independent
187. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
188. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See Int'l Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 266 U.S. 731 (1961).
See id. at 738.
See Finkin, supra note 18, at 199.
See Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 28 (1962).
See NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,434 U.S. 335, 340 (1978).
See Summers, supra note 17, at 536.
749 F.2d 1072, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984).
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organization of workers at Philadelphia Electric Company who were
dissatisfied with representation provided by the Independent Group
Association ("IGA"),1 9 6 which was not an exclusive representative but
was afforded many union privileges.",
The complaint concerned an enhanced grievance procedure
afforded to IGA members, which included opportunities for written
comments, investigation, and mediation, unlike the normal company
grievance procedure. 19 8 The court rejected the Administrative Law
Judge's reasoning, adopted by the Board, that employer assistance to
a labor organization was irrelevant to employees' exercise of section 7
rights in the absence of an exclusive representation campaign:
When an employer accords one non-majority employee group
privileged status over another non-majority group, and thus
encourages membership in the former while discouraging it in the
latter, he unlawfully interferes with the section 7 rights of employees to band together in the group of their choice, even though
neither organization seeks section 9(a) exclusive representation
status.

99

The court's holding that preferential treatment of one NMU over
another is impermissible would seem also to apply to the situation of
NMUs in nonunion workplaces where the employer has established
EPPs. However, the other circuit courts have not ruled on this
question, and the Board's own decision (albeit in the 1980s) not to
find a ULP in Black Grievance Workers may indicate limited staying
power for this doctrine of equality between nonmajority organizations.
C. Do Nonmajority Unions Lead to Worker Organizing?
Why do NMUs sometimes foster union organizing when EPPs
more typically discourage it? The most fundamental reason may be
that worker activism is a prerequisite for the establishment of an
NMU, unlike an EPP. There are many other characteristics of NMUs
that may tend to make these organizations catalysts for union
organizing, as illustrated by the Committee. First, the Committee
recognizes the importance of working with worker centers and other
community groups and running effective public relations campaigns

196.
197.
198.
199.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1074.
Id. at 1077.
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to support their demands. 2°° This helps them build the broad base of
community support necessary to win a union election. 201 Second, the
Committee exists without management interference and influence,
allowing it to work on issues that are priorities to workers. Third,
members of the Committee have developed leadership skills that

would be useful in a union organizing campaign, including the ability
to speak and write persuasively.

Fourth, the Committee acknowl-

edges the specific issues facing African Americans in the workplace
and responds to these issues. Fifth, the Committee has demonstrated
it has the staying power necessary to build momentum and

commitment. 2u Finally, workers who participate in the Committee
can gain confidence in the power of collective action through the
concrete victories of the Committee.
There is not much quantitative research on the issue of whether
NMUs actually lead to the formation of unions, but the little research
that exists tends to confirm this hypothesis. A study by Ischniowski
and Zax looks at workers who are members of union-affiliated
"associations," defined as worker organizations that do not engage in
collective bargaining but provide a variety of benefits to their
members. 2 3 In a survey of non-union employees, they found that
36.5% of the respondents who considered themselves anti-union were

interested in the services an association might provide, 204 and more
205
than 70% of those who were pro-union also favored associations.
Ischniowski and Zax conclude that "the availability of associations
would initially slow the growth of collective bargaining because some

200. The Committee derives significant support from its relationship with Black Workers for
Justice and has drawn on its relationship with community members in at least one highly
publicized campaign. See Telephone Interview with Muhammad, supra note 43; see also Cullen
& Parker,supra note 42, at 1.
201. Many unions recognize the importance of community support during campaigns. See,
e.g., Janice Fine & Richard Locke, Unions Get Smart: New Tactics for a New Labor Movement,
207 DOLLARS & SENSE (1996) (describing the relationship between AFSCME and BUILD, an
organization of black churches, during Baltimore's living wage campaign); Simon Greer,
Community-Labor Alliance Sparks South Carolina, 24 LAB. RES. REV. 87 (1996) (describing
partnership between the International Union of Operating Engineers and the Carolina Alliance
for Fair Employment that led to an election victory for hotel workers at Melrose Resort).
202. See James Green & Chris Tilly, Service Unionism: Directionsfor Organizing, 38 LAB.
L.J. 486, 489 (1987) (advocating that unions develop a "long-term, patient, person-to-person
organizing style" to reach service and clerical workers).
203. See Casey Ichniowski & Jeffrey S. Zax, Today's Associations, Tomorrow's Unions, 43
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 191,192 (1990).
204. See id. at 197.
205. See id. at 195.
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nonunion workers who would vote for a bargaining agent also
support the association form of organizing. '206
However, an analysis of census data by the same researchers
found a strong connection between association membership among
public employees and union membership five years later,0 7 suggesting
that workers' actual, rather than hypothetical, experiences in
associations are more determinative of attitudes toward unions. If
this is the case, the formation of an NMU in a workplace could serve
as an important preliminary step toward union organizing.
Other research supports this interpretation of Ischniowski and
Zax's findings. Jack Fiorito and others interviewed 275 union
officials and studied NLRB election and decertification data and ULP
files. The results demonstrated that "decentralized control contributes to organizing effectiveness... shifting decisions down-ward
in the union to the locals and to the members results in greater
organizing effectiveness. '208 Fiorito and others conclude that the
organizing model of unionism, which focuses on worker empowerment and self-help, is more effective than a model in which the
union appears primarily as a provider of services to its members.20 9
Certainly NMUs can fill an important need for employees
without leading to the formation of unions. Charles Heckscher
advocates for the formation of what he terms associational unions.
These may include groups affiliated with unions, identity groups, and
professional organizations.2 10 Heckscher envisions that associational
unions would engage in membership services and campaigns to
influence public opinion, as well as collective bargaining. 211 Multiple
associations could be present in a single workplace, allowing
"coordinated diversity" in which all workers would have a voice.212 A
number of writers point out that identity caucuses and other forms of
NMUs can both meet needs that traditional unions do not. 213 These

206. Id. at 197.
207. See id. at 200.
208. Jack Fiorito et al., National Union Effectiveness in Organizing: Measures and
Influences, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 613,631 (1995).
209. See id.
210. See HECKSCHER, supra note 7, at 185-87.
211. See id. at 187.
212. See id. at 177.
213. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 15, at 1596-1600 (discussing how women's voices are
ignored and suppressed in unions).
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could pressure unions to become more responsive to the particular
21 4
concerns of different groups that make up their membership.
The Committee's organizing has not resulted in a union election
to date, but the Committee does not focus on that goal.1 5 Without a
majority presence in the plant, the Committee has won a number of

217
important battles: a pay increase, 2 6 a recalculation of variable pay,
and a paid Martin Luther King Day holiday. 2 8 Outside the plant, the

Committee has established itself as an active member of the
community and has built key alliances with other labor and political

struggles throughout the region. 219 These are significant victories for a
worker organization in a right-to-work state.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Since Electromation, many commentators have called for
changes to section 8(a)(2). These writers, and others concerned with

workers' power and representation in the workplace, do not confine
their recommendations to this section of the Act, however. Most also
concern themselves to some degree with expanding unorganized
employees' protection to engage in concerted activity. 220 Many argue
for the expansion of coverage to managerial employees. 221 Others
advocate changes in section 9(a)'s principle of exclusive representation to increase opportunities for NMUs, particularly identity
caucuses.222 I join these writers in their suggestions.
A few writers argue that some NMUs would benefit from
employer assistance. 223 Alan Hyde advocates allowing employer
214. See Hyde, Employee Caucuses, supra note 17, at 160 ("I see the continued existence of
caucuses within labor unions as a potential antidote to some of the problems of unions: their
bureaucracy, weak internal democracy, and low rates of participation.").
215. See Payne, supra note 105; Telephone Interview with Muhammad, supra note 43.
216. See Payne, supra note 105.
217. See 2.5% Raise an Insult After Record Year, supra note 36, at 1.
218. See CDC Workers Celebrate King Day, supra note 37, at 2.
219. Muhammad, supra note 43; see also Committee, supra note 30, at 2.
220. See Hyde, Employee Caucuses, supra note 17, at 170 (arguing for a broad interpretation
of unorganized workers' section 7 rights); Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A
Feminist Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REv. 481, 535 (1992) (Section 7 is "an attempt to codify the
experience of solidarity, and should be construed as broadly as possible.").
221. See Crain, supra note 220, at 505 ("This division of the work force siphons off some of
the most educated and powerful members of the work force, factionalizing the work force and
hampering effective collective resistance to employer power."); Hyde, Employee Caucuses,
supra note 17, at 167 (arguing that the statutory exemption for managerial employees should be
eliminated).
222. See Crain,supra note 220, at 509-10; Crain & Matheny, supra note 15, at 1617.
223. See Hyde, Employee Caucuses, supra note 17, at 187; Gemen, supra note 16, at 387.
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support for employee-initiated groups, "if employees know of the
support and freely choose that form of representation. ' 2 4 He

proposes a system in which employees could vote to authorize the
employer assistance to such a group. 225 Hyde's system would also

cover EPPs created by the employer. Employers who institute their
own EPPs following this formal authorization procedure would have
2 26
a defense to any section 8(a)(2) charges.
In this Note, I discuss a number of studies supporting the
conclusion that EPPs generally do not facilitate meaningful employee

participation in the workplace, and that employers frequently
structure and orient EPPs in such a way as to discourage worker
organizing and employee influence over workplace policies. 227 While
employees who are attempting to organize, or who belong to NMUs,

may be able to take advantage in some limited instances of the
structure of employer-sponsored participation plans to advance their
own causes, overall, the presence of EPPs harms rather than helps

workers' efforts to establish their own form of representation. 228 This
is true even when the EPP does not appear to violate section 8(a)(2),
as in the teams at Ethicon and at CDC. Unlike EPPs, NMUs have

the potential to develop into traditional unions. 229 Even when they do
not, however, the Committee's experience demonstrates that they
provide a vehicle for worker activism, voice, and empowerment.
These findings dictate the course of reform. Those who want to
encourage employer voice and participation in the workplace must
focus their efforts on bolstering NMUs. This entails recognition of
the fact that EPPs may displace worker organizing efforts or drain

them of vitality. How then can we maximize the potential of workercentered organizations and minimize the harm posed by EPPs?
224. Hyde, Employee Caucuses,supra note 17, at 187.
225. See id. at 188.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., GRENIER, supra note 70, at xvi-ii; Fantasia et al., supra note 14, at 471, 476-77.
22& See GRENIER, supra note 70, at 86-89; see also Daphne Taras & Jason Copping, The
Transition from Formal Nonunion Representation to Unionization: A Contemporary Case, 52
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 22, 37 (1998).
229. Some unions that recognize the importance of community support in labor campaigns
and the ability of worker centers to meet the needs of groups of workers identified by gender,
race, and/or immigrant status are working closely with worker centers and, in some cases, even
sponsoring them. Unions like UE also recognize the value of NMUs. See Abby Scher,
Immigrants Fight Back: Workers Centers Lead Where Others Don't, 207 DOLLARS & SENSE 35
(1996) (ILGWU has opened worker centers in five cities since 1991); Jos6 De Paz, Organizing
Ourselves: Drywallers' Strike Holds Lessons for the Future of Labor Organizing, 20 LAB. RES.
REV. 26 (1993) (describing the work of the California Immigrant Workers Association, an
associational union established by the AFL-CIO Organizing Department).
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Alan Hyde's proposal is significant because it provides a formal
mechanism for employees to reject EPPs through a majority vote of
employees. 230 I support this aspect of his proposal. I am, however,
wary of his suggestion that NMUs seek employer assistance via an
election process. This has the potential to enmesh NMUs, with their
extremely limited resources, into a morass of campaigning and divert
their energy from more pressing issues. 23 1 I would instead propose
codifying the decision of Black Grievance Committee v. NLRB 232 to
require that an employer who establishes an EPP provide equal
resources to any independent worker organization of more than a
certain number of workers, perhaps just two (to be consistent with the
concerted activity requirement). Equality of resources could be
defined to include employer financial support, use of company
facilities, and access to management. Worker centers and associational unions could take advantage of this provision by establishing
subcommittees specific to a particular workplace.
Hyde encourages NMUs to assert their right to equal treatment
under the Third Circuit's decision. 233 However, the Board has failed
to expressly ratify that opinion, and later Board decisions enforcing
the rights of NMUs to equal assistance have typically done so in the
context of union campaigns. 231 In order for NMUs to have a fighting
chance at enforcing this right, the Act should explicitly include it.
Section 8(a)(2) would read simply that an employer that supports or
assists a labor organization must offer equal assistance and/or
resources to any independent worker organization of a certain size at
that worksite.
There are disadvantages to this proposal. Most significantly,
NMUs that receive employer support could find this undermines their
independence and fosters loyalty to the company. Fledgling groups

230. See Hyde, Employee Caucuses, supra note 17, at 188.
231. I am less concerned that NMUs would devote significant resources to the fight to reject
employer-sponsored initiatives.
232. 749 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1984).
233. See Hyde, After Smyrna, supra note 17, at 659.
234. See, e.g., NLRB v. Conn. Color, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 699 (1988) (employer violated
section 8(a)(1) by forbidding union members to post literature on company bulletin board
where employees posted personal notices and solicitations); NLRB v. Raytheon Missile Sys.
Div., 277 N.L.R.B. 1528 (1986) (upholding the decision that employer's denial of in-plant union
organizing committee's request to post notices for a violation of section 8(a)(1) where
employees and outside organizations were allowed to do so). But see NLRB v. Northeastern
Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding a violation of section 8(a)(1) when the university
denied a meeting space to an employee chapter from 9 A.M. to 5 P.M., when this space was
available to other employee organizations).
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may be tempted to seek resources from their employers; because they
are new, they may also be most vulnerable to being coopted. NMUs
that accept employer assistance are also still faced with the problem
of EPPs that undermine organizing.
These are real issues for NMUs. However, some employee
groups truly do not want an adversarial relationship with their
employer;235 the voice of these members would be strengthened by
this proposal. NMUs that fear being compromised by accepting
employer assistance are not required to seek it. These groups would
still have the ability to challenge an employer's participation plan
through the periodic election process that Hyde proposes.
Alternatively, these groups could try the equal access option and
decide for themselves whether it was worth the risk.
As to the problem of the continued existence of EPPs, most
employers would probably forego EPPs rather than comply with this
revised section 8(a)(2). Employers that accept an NMU's challenge
and provide assistance while maintaining their own program of EPPs
face the continued risk that a majority vote of the employees could
dismantle the EPP. Those employers who are truly committed to
worker participation would not be precluded from establishing EPPs
as long as they are equally amenable to the presence of NMUs. EPPs
established by such employers are less likely to present the barriers to
worker organizing than EPPs that are set up for the purpose of
containing and channeling employee voice.
CONCLUSION

In this Note, I argue that EPPs frequently do not lead to
enhanced employee voice in the workplace, nor do they encourage
union organizing. The presence of an NMU in the workplace, in
contrast, may create conditions under which union organizing is more
likely to occur. Even where this does not happen, NMUs help
workers to develop a sense of collective power and the skills to
achieve change in the workplace.
Reforms to section 8(a)(2) must be carefully crafted if worker
organizing is to be furthered and worker voice enhanced. I would
require employers who sponsor their own participation programs to
offer similar resources to any NMU that has been organized in that
235. See, e.g., Hyde, Employee Caucuses, supra note 17, at 156 (describing Employees for
One TekCo, an employee group that does not seek to become a union and whose members are
generally happy with their employer).
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workplace. This proposal would achieve several purposes: the
elimination of EPPs in workplaces where employers do not want
enhanced employee voice; the provision of employer assistance to
worker-sponsored organizations where the organizations might
benefit from such assistance; and the encouragement of NMUs as an
alternative place where workers can express their voices and create
change through that expression.

